17 Michael Kofman, A Look at the Military Lessons of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Russian Matters, 14 December 2020, https://www.russiamatters.org/. After all, as Yeo puts it: [J]ust because the system appears ready to deal with potential adversaries today, it would be foolish to assume that the status quo would hold in the long or even medium term.65 On that note, in an essay on black swans penned by three RSAF officers, they rightly state that [e]ven if solutions [to such low-probability scenarios] are impractical or prove to be too costly to implement, the very fact that debates and discussions have been carried out would already enhance the preparedness of the commanders and planners.66 Thus, at the very least, just bringing the three main takeaways into Singapores air defense discourse should stand the republic in good stead as the Lion City, in Ngs words, looks towards the next phase of the Island Air Defense System . 37 Kofman, A Look at the Military Lessons of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.. 52 Robert Bateman, No, Drones Havent Made Tanks Obsolete, Foreign Policy, 15 October 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/. .

19 On UAV operations in Libya, for instance, see Tom Kington, Libya Is Turning into a Battle Lab for Air Warfare, Defense News, 6 August 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/. 57 Robin Forestier-Walker, Nagorno-Karabakh: New Weapons for an Old Conflict Spell Danger, Al Jazeera, 13 October 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/. 58 Michael Knights and Conor Hiney, Plugging the Gaps in Saudi Arabias Air Defenses, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 25 September 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/. It is a truism in air defense planning that simply owning individual capabilities to counter a range of threats does not translate automatically into an IADS.17 To compound matters, most Armenian surface-to-air missile (SAM) platforms were designs several decades old. Armenia did not have such a system in place during the war, and this contributed profoundly to its defeat in the field.

Greg Waldron, Singapores Air Force Eyes Long-Term Challenges, FlightGlobal, 4 February 2020, https://www.flightglobal.com/.

These vehicles could fly a preprogrammed route to its target and need not communicate with their operators. It is also telling that Armenias most capable SAMthe long-range but 40-odd-year-old S-300was conceived to handle higher-end threats such as larger-signature manned aircraft (which played a minuscule role on either side in the conflict). Indeed, this is a point not lost on members of the republics defense establishment.8 Ultimately, the Lion Citys potential adversaries (whether state or nonstate) should be cognizant of the republics overwhelming conventional military superiority and realize that to confront it head-on would likely be courting defeat. Ultimately, the most exquisite military capability is only as good as its handler. This then raises the question of What if the Azeris were the ones operating the platform and would this affect the course of the war? Given Azeri inexperience with the TB2, it is likely that the Azeris would not handle the TB2 as well if they did not have at least some Turkish helpand the course of the war might have been less favorable to Baku. However, it is arguably the only way to test the credibility of a system that was conceptualized in 2006 and will continue to serve Singapore for decades to come. Indeed, as the Singapore Armed Forces transitions toward a next-generation fighting force as per the SAFs 2030 vision, acquisitions of new land and naval platforms, not to mention a possible purchase of more F-35B jets, will impact whether the suggestions put forth in this analysis can be implemented.63 Ultimately, it boils down to Singapores more pressing defense needs. Currently, some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are stationed along the strategic Lachin Corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. After all, there is a capability overlap between the anti-UAV and -RAM portfolios.

What is more, Armenia did not seem to take heed of the Azeris nascent UAV fleet following the latters exploits during the 2016 Four-Day War and continued to let its decrepit SHORAD capabilities wither in the period since.18 The exploits of drones in various Middle Eastern and North African conflicts in recent years should also have made Armenias military bigwigs sit up and take note, but this did not seem to be the case.19 It is telling that Yerevan had bought 27 secondhand 9K33s from Jordanian sources for $35 million as recently as January 2020. Therefore, expect asymmetric capabilities such as massed UAVs and RAM fires to dominate any aerial operational calculus of Singapores likely foes.9 All that being said, before delving into the three insights, a short account of Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 is in order.

3 With Singapore joining the F-35 club, the republic will be the first in Southeast Asia to operate fifth-generation aircraft. 31 Mike Yeo, Fighter Jets Get Attention but Defending Singapore Against Rockets and Drones Require Very Different Tools, Channel News Asia, 14 February 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/. 15 Uzi Rubin, The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Milestone in Military Affairs (Tel Aviv: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2020), 5. And much like how electronic warfare could kick down the air defense door of the enemy, the other side of the coin is that it also provides for a credible air defenseand therein lies the next lesson from the second Nagorno-Karabakh War: EW contributes to a credible antidrone edifice. This is so according to open sources, such as the infographic on the IAD that MINDEF has released.44 In the same vein, according to the 2021 edition of the authoritative Military Balance, the Lion Citys armed forces do not own any dedicated EW platforms whatsoever.45, Obtaining individual EW capabilities would layer another level of redundancy into Singapores air defense system. 50 See, for example, Gady and Stronell, What the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revealed About Future Warfighting. Russian analysts echo their views. 12 Welt and Bowen, Azerbaijan and Armenia, 11. 30 The Military Balance 2021, 298. To illustrate, a 2011 analysis describes the RSAF as Southeast Asias preeminent air power: capable, well balanced, technological advanced, and staffed by skilled personnel. It adds that dvanced weapon systems are complemented by excellent indigenous technical services, a first-class training organization, and modern command control practices." Operator fault due to lack of proficiency, however, contributed to the failure of Riyadh to defend against the September 2019 drone and cruise-missile strike.58 Last of all, the tragic accidental shootdown of a Ukrainian airliner in January 2020 by Iranian forces shows how complex and error-prone air defense can be, even with a modern SAM system such as the Russian-made Tor-M1. Although the war in the Caucasus seems far-flung from Singapore both geographically and in terms of their respective security environments, the conflict is relevant to the Southeast Asian state in that it offers valuable broad insights on how better to strengthen its defense against unconventional aerial challenges that may surface beyond the near future. However, the S-300 was unsuited to counter smaller UAVs such as the Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions and the Turkish-made TB2 drones in Bakus arsenal. Equally significant is the fact that a well-run Red Aegis would no doubt strengthen deterrence and make potential malign actors think twice about targeting Singapore with unconventional air threats. 26 Tang See Kit, Singapore Quite Confident of Detecting and Neutralising Drones Used in Saudi Attacks: Ng Eng Hen, CNA, 7 October 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/.

As for how the drone war in Syria unfolded, see Alex Gatopoulos, Battle for Idlib: Turkeys Drones and a New Way of War, Al Jazeera, 3 March 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/.

One way to do this is to hold a drill that tests the IAD system in its entirety against unconventional aerial threats such as massed drones/RAM fires. Over the decades since Singapores independence in 1965, bilateral ties with its two neighbors have occasionally been fraught with tensions over various issues. 8 To illustrate, when asked during a media interview about the aerial challenges Singapore faces in the future, Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen stressed the need to deal with the whole spectrum, whether the threat be longer range munitions, as we saw for example in the missiles [attack] against the oil depots in the Middle East, or non-traditional from terrorist attacks, things that you can buy on the web, or the dark web. Transcript of Doorstop Interview with Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen During Visit to RSAF Island Air Defence Operations, MINDEF Singapore, 17 December 2020, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/. 28 Yonah Jeremy Bob, How Much Does Hamass Rocket Arsenal Cost?, Jerusalem Post, 17 May 2021, https://www.jpost.com/. The right system with the wrong TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] for employment will be ineffective.61, This brings us to another instructive point made about the importance of the soft elements for air forces (or any military entity in general): [I]n its totality, airpower is a complex amalgam of equipment and less tangible but equally important enabling ingredients bearing on its overall effectiveness, such as employment doctrine, concepts of operations, training and tactics, leadership quality, adaptability, operator proficiency, boldness in execution and practical combat experience. While kinetic measures (whether they be missiles or AAA shells) certainly have a place in any air defense system, stray projectiles, jettisoned missile boosters, or remnants of a successful missile kill could land on civilian areas. What is more, all Armenian-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh were ceded back to Azerbaijan by 1 December 2020. For a discussion of this quandary, see Tom Karako and Wes Shambaugh, Distributed Defense: New Operational Concepts for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), 1314. Samuel Bendett, Russias Real-World Experience Is Driving Counter-Drone Innovations, Defense News, 23 May 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/. 49 Malaysia uses the SS-30 rocket (30-kilometer range) for its Astros II. John Andreas Olsen (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2011), 327.

63 For a list of new capability procurements for the SAF going forward, see Matthew Mohan, Significant and Steady Investments in Defence Required to Keep Singapores Future Secure: Ng Eng Hen, Channel News Asia, 1 March 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/. must be synchronized with materiel to maximize their effectiveness. 40 Shaikh and Rumbaugh, The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In 2016, for example, Indonesian jihadists plotted to fire a rocket at a popular Singapore waterfront. . The Military Balance 2021, 282. This takeaway about Armenias unintegrated and obsolescent air defenses therefore affirms Singapores prudence in constituting a sophisticated, layered, and networked system in the form of the Island Air Defense setup.22 In principle, at least, the IAD is properly designed and integrated to function in the twenty-first-century air domain. 20 While Armenia reported losses of 15 9K33s, Azerbaijan said it destroyed 40 of them, so the truth is probably something in between. In fact, the risk of collateral damage from these due to Singapores highly urbanized and built-up landscape could potentially be more serious than anything inflicted by the hostile platform itself. However, acquiring single-role platforms such as a standalone EW asset would seem counterintuitive considering the Singapore militarys desire of doing more with less. Nevertheless, this issue is something that bears deliberation for Singapores military planners given the increasing significance of electronic warfare (and not just for air defense purposes) in the twenty-first-century operational environment. On this note, Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen of Singapore has stated that it would neither be proportionate cost-effective nor sustainable to use sophisticated assets to take down improvised aerial threats such as hobbyist drones.26, It bears consideration that the drones used in the September 2019 attack on Saudi oil installations had a unit cost of $20,000 or less, while Riyadhs Patriot SAM that should have protected the kingdom against attack but did not for various reasons was priced at $3 million.27 In the same vein, engaging with pricey missiles $800 per unit homemade rockets, such as the Qassam frequently used by Palestinian militants, does not make much financial sense.28. For one, Mike Yeo asserts in a piece for the Singapore state media outlet CNA that Singapore should consider reintroducing the old-fashioned AAAin its modern incarnations, of course.31 Citing the Phalanx and Skyshield, he is on point, as such weapons have a much higher rate of firea vastly desirable attribute against swarmscompared to missile launchers, and the interceptors AAA use have a much lower unit cost in comparison to missiles.32 AAA is useful as it meets both the antidrone and RAM requirements. Similarly, a 2020 report speaks of the RSAF as unmatched among regional air forces. To be certain, Yerevan had made upgrades to this system throughout the years, but the inescapable fact is that these tweaks improved incrementally at best a Cold War relic. Shockingly, the launchers in some of these SAM sites were not even in deployment mode, as if no war was going on in the first place.53. 6 A good source for the lessons for US armed forces would be Nicole Thomas, Matt Jamison, Kendall Gomber, and Derek Walton, What the United States Military Can Learn from the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Small Wars Journal, 4 April 2021, https://smallwarsjournal.com/. The democratization of technology could also accentuate the RAM threat to Singapore. Mr. Ho is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Studies Program at Singapores S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and he holds a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies from the same institution. While Singapore has often spent generously on defense, hard choices must be made in the real world. Even if Singapore does have the GAI-C01, it is unsuited to counter swarm threats given its relatively small magazine size and low rate of fire. While Azeri EW could explain this anemic situation, it is also conceivable that operator ineptness was responsible.54 One Armenian commentator also makes an informed speculation that his countrys GBAD personnel could suffer from lack of situational awareness.55 Armenian battlefield incompetence in terms of air defense could also be seen in the fact that the SAMs were deployed in relatively exposed fixed positions, in a mountainous region where air defense is even more difficult by virtue of the terrain.56 To be sure Azeri forces also displayed signs of field ineptness, especially during the initial stages of the war.57 However, these were arguably mitigated to some degree by their material superiority.

The Oryx military affairs blog is considered one of the most authoritative open sources when it comes to documenting losses on both sides during the second Nagorno-Karabakh War. It is worth noting that the 2016 iteration of Exercise Vigilant Shield also involved a simulated hijacked plane. 27 Michael Knights, Continued Houthi Strikes Threaten Saudi Oil and the Global Economic Recovery, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12 March 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/. 64 Transcript of Doorstop Interview with Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen During Visit to RSAF Island Air Defence Operations, MINDEF Singapore, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/. 5 For a concise and cogent analysis of the aerial domain in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War, see Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh, The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Lessons for the Future of Strike and Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 2020, https://www.csis.org/.

34 Speech Transcript by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at the Ministry of Defence Committee of Supply Debate 2018, MINDEF Singapore, 30 June 2018, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/. And there is a danger that the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan duel has unique features that make generalizations difficult, and there is the risk that the wrong observations will be drawn from it. The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense,Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.

Alexander Stronell, Learning the Lessons of Nagorno-Karabakh the Russian Way, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 10 March 2021, https://www.iiss.org/. One may possess on paper the best EW, SAM, or any other capability, but all would be for naught if their users lack competency. See RSAF Exercises National Air Defence Capabilities, MINDEF Singapore, 28 November 2016, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/. A dollar spent on a certain area or capability means a dollar less in another place, unless MINDEFs share of the budget pie could be enlarged.

25 This is an issue that also bedevils major powers, including the United States.

See, for example, Captain (CPT) Daryn Koh, How Singapore and the SAF Can Get Ready for the Era of Swarm UAVs, Pointer 46 No. 59 SAF Air Defence Task Force Leads National Air Defence Exercise, MINDEF Singapore, 14 March 2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/. 13 Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, The Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses on The Sides of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Oryx (blog), 27 September 2020, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/. Coming back to the Singapore context, Yeo has correctly stressed the need for the republics IAD to defend against EW being applied against it considering its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh War.43 The flipside of the issue is true as well, and one way the role of electronic warfare in Singapores Island Air Defense should be accentuated is through the acquisition of dedicated EW assets.

7 Chinese-majority Singapore is sandwiched between two Muslim-majority states, Malaysia and Indonesia. According to an informed sources account of the travails of Armenian SAM sites: During the war, Bayraktar TB2s literally flew circles near three S-300 sites while waiting for the ballistic missiles and loitering munitions directed against them to strike their targets before doing damage assessment and flying away. . 4 RAM munitions are simply too fast for fighters to counter. They also largely account for why some air forces are simply better and more combat effective than others.62. In such an organization, the competence (or lack of it) on the part of its personnel would be amplified. Regarding sensors, for example, the Agile Multiple Beam Radar is designed for surveillance of drones and RAM fires. See Alexander Yermakov, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles over Nagorno-Karabakh: Revolution or Another Day of Battle, Valdai Discussion Club, 4 December 2020, https://valdaiclub.com/; and David Hambling, The Magic Bullet Drones Behind Azerbaijans Victory Over Armenia, Forbes, 10 November 2020, https://www.forbes.com/.

14 Mitzer and Oliemans, The Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh.. After all, Yerevans SHORAD inventory consisted largely of the obsolescent 9K33s. As it turned out, the weather was good up until the last week of the war, the Armenian air defense was not effective against the Azerbaijani UAS onslaught, and the few Russian-made CUAS systems that the Armenians possessed proved ineffective. Antal, The First War Won Primarily with Unmanned Systems. For a similar argument, see Rubin, The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.