This assignment is not too general. Shortly after she consumed her drink Shirley became very nauseated.

Life Ins. *700 Wetumpka, for Southern Life & Health Ins. Mrs. Dennison later sought to obtain a $5,000 policy on Shirley's life from Liberty National but she was informed by Bailey that such a policy could not be written. There is no direct evidence going to show that Mrs. Dennison had knowledge of the fact that the National Life policy had been issued at the time she killed the child. As it appears to me, such knowledge on the part of Mrs. Dennison, under all the circumstances of the case, does not follow as a reasonable conclusion from the fact that she did not act until after the policy reached Wetumpka. The New York court observed that if void there was no occasion for a judgment directing the surrender and cancellation of the policy. The argument made by counsel for the appellants in support of Assignment of Error No. Vinson v. Vinson, 256 Ala. 259, 54 So. Co. T. B. Hill, Jr., Montgomery, W. H. Sadler, Jr., Birmingham, and Edwin Sanford. The argument made by National Life in support of its contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give the above-quoted affirmative instruction is to the effect that there is an entire absence of evidence going to show that the National Life policy could have been an inducement for Mrs. Dennison to murder Shirley inasmuch as she had no knowledge of the fact that the policy had been issued. Shirley again became violently nauseated and that condition continued until she became almost unconscious. There being no merit in the ground of the demurrers which we understand the appellants to have argued in brief filed here, we hold that error in overruling the demurrers is not made to appear. 422, 158 P.2d 715; Gontrum v. Union Liberty Life Ins. Shirley had spent only one night under a roof with Mrs. Dennison and that was on an occasion when her entire family spent the night in the Dennison home and that visit was made while Mr. Dennison, the brother of Shirley's mother, was living. Assignment of Error 24 of each appellant reads: "24. 2d 96; Tyler v. Drennen, 255 Ala. 377, 51 So. The defendants' motions for change *701 of venue were denied. They lived in different towns several miles apart. Keener went to Mrs. Dennison and inquired about the delay. 425, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 978; Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., D.C. 106 F. Supp. In support of those motions, wherein they averred in effect that they could not get a fair and impartial trial in Elmore County, the defendants relied in the main on a newspaper story concerning this suit which appeared in the October 22, 1953, issue of the Wetumpka Herald, a newspaper widely circulated in Elmore County. This court has held in several cases that assignments of error couched in such general language will not be considered. Co. of America, 176 N.Y. 178, 68 N.E. The certificate was not executed by the family doctor, or even by a doctor connected with the hospital where Mrs. Dennison worked as a nurse. Of course, if there was no such duty the defendants *708 were entitled to the general affirmative charge with hypothesis, as requested. 166, 289 P. 734; Prudential Ins. The Southern Life policy did contain a provision to the effect that Shirley's mother was a contingent beneficiary. Co. of Alva, Okl. Life. She was admitted to a hospital in Wetumpka shortly after her arrival there. 2d 35, and cases there cited. Jur., 318. Co. v. Middlebrooks, 27 Ala.App. Helmetag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183; Commonwealth Life Ins. At that time Keener had never seen Shirley or her parents, but later on the same day he drove to the Weldon home in compliance with a rule of his company that he certify to the company that he "has seen the child." To be actionable it must be the breach of a duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff as an individual or one of a class (Stowers v. Dwight Mfg. No case has come to our attention where this specific question has been considered by any court. As stated above, we think these circumstances sufficient to present a question for jury decision as to whether the issuance of the National Life policy acted to induce Mrs. Dennison to murder plaintiff's minor daughter. 2d 417; Campbell v. Jackson, 257 Ala. 618, 60 So. But as before indicated, the plaintiff says, in effect, that such harm would not have come to his little girl if the defendants had not wrongfully or negligently issued to Mrs. Dennison the alleged illegal policies covering Shirley's life. Co. v. Ball, 157 Miss. Gibson v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 65 Vt. 213, 26 A. The verdict rendered in this case is large, perhaps the largest to come before this court in a case brought under the so-called homicide statute, 119 and 123, Title 7, Code 1940. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bogue, 177 Ala. 349, 58 So.

392. National Life's policy in the amount of $1,000 was issued on or about April 23, 1952. 2d 164.

We hold that Assignment of Error No. 2d 189, 145 A.L.

She died within a comparatively short time after she was admitted to the hospital. In considering this assignment we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, for when an affirmative instruction is refused and the party who requested the charge appeals, the entire evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the opposite party and where reasonable inferences may be drawn adverse to the party who requested the charge, the action of trial court in refusing the charge must be affirmed. 2d 294; Almon v. Commission of Education of Cullman County, 265 Ala. 489, 92 So. We simply call attention to one incident which we think clearly shows why Mrs. Dennison poisoned the child. At the mother's insistence Shirley was taken to Wetumpka in search of a doctor. 18, 20, this court observed: "True, industrial insurance is a form of life insurance, but it is distinctive in character and is classed in the Code with mutual aid and benefit insurance, though it has features distinctive from them as well as from ordinary and other old line insurance." 1, p. 385. 520, L.R.A.1916F, 457] draws a distinction between ordinary life and industrial insurance, and excepts the latter from the general rule that one without an insurable interest in the life of another may not collect the policy; and such distinction was followed in the recent case of Krumphorn v. John Hancock Mut. 2d 224; Aircraft Sales & Service Co. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So. The rule stated in this Section applies when the actor's conduct creates a situation which is utilized by a third person to intentionally inflict harm upon another or provides a temptation thereto to which the third person yields, the actor having no reason to expect that the third person would so act. Littlefield v. State, 36 Ala.App. 180, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 282; Adams v. Queen Insurance Co. of America, 264 Ala. 572, 88 So. The evidence is also clear to the effect that Mrs. Dennison murdered the child in order to collect insurance benefits payable *704 to her upon the child's death. The evidence was sufficient to show a lack of insurable interest. 66 P. Southern Life's Assignment of Error No. That was one of the issues in the case and the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that Mrs. Dennison murdered the little girl. He stated that he had never been given any instructions by his company concerning that subject. We do not consider the Garrett case, supra, as being authority for the proposition asserted by the defendants. Assignment of Error No. The newspaper story pointed out the theory on which the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, the amount of damages claimed, the ruling of the trial court on the demurrers, the date the case was set for trial, and the fact that it involved questions of considerable interest to the legal profession and to the insurance business. Such a conclusion, as I see it, rests on speculation or conjecture rather than reasonable inference.

690; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Adams, 199 Ark. Ground 33 of the demurrer filed separately by each defendant reads: "For that it affirmatively appears that said policies of insurance on the life of the said Shirley Dianne Weldon were void and worthless and hence could in fact constitute no inducement to kill said child.". 2d 492; City of Mobile v. Reeves, 249 Ala. 488, 31 So. But as we have shown, that relationship standing alone was not sufficient to sustain an insurable interest and, in fact, Mrs. Dennison was only an aunt-in-law. Yet in all three insurance policies involved in this case there is the statement that at one time or another the insurance company may require proof of insurable interest. The application for the Southern Life policy was obtained from Mrs. Dennison on January 24, 1952, by Eugene Keener, who had been an agent for that company for fourteen years. 298, 305. *703 The matter of granting change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 73; Brauer v. New York Central & H. R. Co., 91 N.J.L. 734; Mallory v. O'Neil, Fla., 69 So. We proceed to state, as briefly as we can, the conclusions we have attained in regard to the several assignments of error which are insisted upon in the brief filed here on behalf of the appellants. 249 Ala. 479, 31 So. That part of the quoted clause which we have italicized does provide that "the Company may make payment to any relative by blood or marriage, or to any person appearing to the Company to be equitably entitled to such payment because of having incurred expense for the maintenance, medical attention or burial of the Insured," but that right exists only in the event "the Beneficiary fail to file a claim with the Company within sixty days after the death of the Insured." Co. v. George, supra. Our court has repeatedly dealt with and defined "proximate cause." He told Mrs. Weldon that Mrs. Dennison wanted to take out an educational policy on Shirley. The defendants separately plead the general issue in short by consent in the usual form. As we have heretofore observed, each of the counts in the complaint contains an averment to the effect that the wrongful or negligent acts of the three insurance companies concurred or united in proximately contributing to or causing the death of plaintiff's minor child. The damages are entirely punitive, imposed for the preservation of human life. But the decision in the Garrett case went off on the fact that the "willful independent" act of the third person was "neither intended nor anticipated by the defendant." Kuchlik v. Feuer, 239 App.Div. Plaintiff's counsel took the position that the policy was void. 277; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maddox, 236 Ala. 594, 183 So. He had never seen her before, but accepted her application for a $5,000 policy on Shirley's life and accepted from Mrs. Dennison the sum of $8.20 as payment of her first premium. Accordingly we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing the affirmative charge with hypothesis as requested by the defendants. The opinion states that "National Life was entitled to an affirmative instruction in its favor unless the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Mrs. Dennison knew that the policy had been issued * * *" and "There is no direct evidence going to show that Mrs. Dennison had knowledge of the fact that the National Life policy had been issued at the time she killed the child.". Section 119, Title 7, Code 1940, the statute under which this action was brought, provides that for the wrongful death of a minor child the persons there *713 entitled to sue, if entitled to a verdict, "shall recover such damages as the jury may assess." There were verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $75,000. The policy was mailed to National Life's agent in Wetumpka, Alabama, on or about April 29, 1952. 293; Title 7, 139, Code 1940. But our reading of the cases, not only those cited by the plaintiff, but many of those cited by the defendants, show the majority rule to be that stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts by the American Law Institute, 448, as follows: "The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created thereby and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime. Quite a number of definitions are quoted in Western Railway of Alabama v. Mutch, 97 Ala. 194, 11 So. 849, 118 A.L.R. In their brief the defendants say that the evidence shows that "in the instant case, the separate, independent, superseding, wilful, malicious, crime of murder became `the responsible cause' of the death of Shirley Dianne Weldon.". A material allegation of each of the counts of plaintiff's complaint was that Mrs. Dennison murdered Shirley.

The policy issued by National Life had not been delivered to Mrs. Dennison at the time of Shirley's death. Shirley lived in the home of her parents with her brother and sister and received her entire support from her parents. 680, 682; Southern Ry. There is no legal justification for the creation of such a risk to an insured and there is no social gain in the writing of a void policy of insurance. He testified that he found traces of arsenic on articles of clothing worn by Shirley and by Mrs. Dennison at the time the drinks were served and he further testified that he found traces of arsenic in the cup from which Shirley drank. The defendants below, the appellants here, assert with considerable emphasis in briefs filed in this court that there was no duty on them to determine whether Mrs. Dennison at the time the policies were issued had an insurable interest in the life of the plaintiff's minor daughter. I charge you that if you believe the evidence in this case you cannot find for the plaintiff.'" But if the injury results from an independent, intervening, efficient cause, not reasonably to be anticipated, to wit, the act of a third person, the negligence shown, if any, is not the proximate cause of the injury. 2d 412. 2d 378. We hold that no error resulted from the trial court's rulings on the motions for a change of venue, even if properly presented, which is not questioned by appellee, but see Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Sanders, 98 Ala. 293, 13 So. Keener knew that Shirley was living with her parents but apparently was not at all concerned about the matter of insurable interest or lack of it. Bailey admitted *706 that when he delivered the policy to Mrs. Dennison he knew that Shirley was not living with Mrs. Dennison and understood at that time that the child was living with her parents. According to Keener's testimony, only one further act remained to be done and that was for Mrs. Dennison to get a medical certificate stating that Shirley had been examined by a doctor who found her in good health. The latter contention will be dealt with later on in this opinion. 271, 272, where Mr. Justice Anderson, writing for the court, said: "* * * It is sufficient to say that count 1 was not subject to any of the grounds of demurrer, and the sufficiency of same is supported by the case, cited by counsel for appellant. At the time he took the application Oxford knew that Mrs. Dennison, while working in Wetumpka, lived in Holtville and that Shirley lived with her parents in Claud, a community situate several miles from Holtville and Wetumpka. In fact, in answer to interrogatories Liberty National took the position that its agents were not given any instructions concerning any requirement as to insurable interest in the type of policy issued to Mrs. Dennison, contending no such interest was necessary in that type of policy. This is a suit by Gaston Weldon, who sues as the father of Shirley Dianne Weldon, deceased, his minor daughter, under 119, Title 7, Code 1940, the so-called homicide statute, against Liberty National Life Insurance Company, a corporation; National Life & Accident Insurance Company, a corporation; and Southern Life & Health Insurance Company, a corporation. 62 are those which take the point that the verdict is grossly excessive. The question of proximate cause was properly left for the jury's determination. Liberty National's policy presenty under consideration is labeled "Special Monthly Endowment Insurance" on the cover and is described as "Endowment Insurance" on the front page, but it is in a comparatively small amount, $500, and the premiums were payable monthly. Moreover, Mrs. Dennison was not an aunt of Shirley but an aunt-in-law and the courts seem to be in accord in holding that an in-law relationship in and of itself does not sustain an insurable interest. In State ex rel.

Here we have an intervening cause, the criminal act of Mrs. Dennison. 2d 509. 1318; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Courson, 234 Ala. 273, 174 So. 2d 388. Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So. 105; Seith v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 252, 89 N.E. We do not think the holding in the Gooch Case is in any way controlling here. The theory on which plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the defendants is that Mrs. Dennison had no insurable interest in Shirley's life and that the defendants knew or should have known that fact; and, that by reason of the wrongful and negligent issuance of the "illegal" policies of insurance Mrs. Dennison murdered Shirley with the hope of collecting the insurance proceeds. We repeat what we said above to the effect that the jury could well find from the evidence presented that none of the insurance companies were concerned about the matter of insurable interest and did not undertake to exercise reasonable care not to issue a policy to a beneficiary without insurable interest. In view of these distinctions we are unwilling to say that Liberty National's policy was one of "industrial insurance.". 2d 565, certiorari denied, 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. National Life & Accident Ins.

As heretofore shown, the first of the three policies issued on the life of Shirley with which we are presently concerned was that issued by Liberty National. Co. Godbold & Hobbs and Truman Hobbs, Montgomery, for appellee. See Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (Second Ed. (Emphasis supplied.). Aircraft Sales & Service v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So. Co. v. Arnold, 162 Ala. 570, 50 So. 624, 11 A.2d 625, 627. 816, which they say "is the law of Alabama." Assignment of Error No. 190, 103 A. Stoudemire was a lifelong friend of the plaintiff and saw him almost daily, but he never told plaintiff or Mrs. Weldon that the policy had been issued and that policy was in force about five months before Shirley was killed. 252; Life & Casualty Ins. 225; Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 26 S.E.2d 698, 705; Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. In other words, it would appear that if the question of insurable interest was not involved, National Life could not have successfully defended against a claim under the policy, if Shirley had died a natural death on May 1, 1952, on the ground that National's agent had neither delivered the policy to Mrs. Dennison nor notified her that it had been issued prior to the child's death. Persons who perpetrate torts are, as a rule, responsible and only responsible for the proximate consequences of the wrongs they commit. The evidence further tends to show that the policy of Southern Life had been delivered to Mrs. Dennison prior to the time she made application to National Life, so at that time she had insurance on the child's life in the amount of $5,500. 338, 267 N.Y.S. LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. R. 667; Caudle v. Birmingham Electric Co., 247 Ala. 34, 22 So. A. Simpson, Chas. Keener apparently was not interested in pursuing the matter further, although as shown above he made a visit to the very humble home in which the Weldons lived. The preliminary proof identifying and describing the dress or sun suit complied with the rule and that article was admitted in evidence without error. 2d 910, 170 A.L.R. Several options were provided for any proceeds going to the beneficiary by reason of the death of the insured. v. 2d 167; Shirley v. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So. Co. of America v. Howell, 144 Okl. 468. We have held to the contrary. We will sometimes hereafter refer to Gaston Weldon as the plaintiff, to his deceased child as Shirley, and to the defendant insurance companies as Liberty National, National Life and Southern Life. B. Robinson and Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, and Robt. The newspaper account was concluded with these words in parentheses: "Not the $64,000 question but the $100,000 question.". 2d 322. The defendants say in their brief: "The adoption of the theory contended for on behalf of the plaintiff would place upon an insurance company an impossible burden." No ground of demurrer is referred to in that argument and we do not feel called upon to analyze that argument in an attempt to find some part or parts of it which might be said to show that one or more of the innumerable grounds of the demurrers were well taken.

(R. pp. No such examination was ever made and Shirley's parents did not know until after her death that the policy had in fact been issued in March of 1952. Hall v. Pearce, 209 Ala. 397, 96 So. Section 273, Title 28, Code 1940, in our opinion does not have that effect.

That is the rule laid down by this and other courts with some slight variance in the language by which the thought is expressed, such as that the intervening event must be the "natural and reasonable" or "ordinary and natural" result of the initial negligence. The purpose of such an inquiry made after death is to effectuate a saving to the insurance company of the payment of the amount of the insurance carried. 2d 252; Downes v. Norrell, 261 Ala. 430, 74 So. *709 We come now to the contention of the appellants that they were entitled to the affirmative instruction presently under consideration for the reason that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden which was upon him to present some evidence tending to show that the defendants' acts were the proximate cause of Shirley's death. Each of the policies provided that the death benefits be paid to Mrs. Dennison.

But there is very little use of reviewing our many cases where the question of proximate cause is involved. In the case of Fulcher v. Parker, supra, relied upon by Liberty National, two of the policies involved did not name a beneficiary and the other contained a facilitating clause of the kind outlined above.

Carraway Methodist Hospital v. Pitts, 256 Ala. 665, 57 So. * * *. We come now to a consideration of those assignments of error argued in the brief of appellants which do not apply to all of them. 2d 459; Railway Express Co. v. Real, 253 Ala. 489, 45 So.